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I.

INTRODUCTION

In “toxic tort” lawsuits, or claims brought as a result of
exposure to hazardous substances, a typical plaintiff “alleges he has
developed a disease because of exposure to a toxic substance
1
negligently released by the defendant.” In some cases, however,
the plaintiffs “seek to recover the costs of long-term diagnostic
testing and medical examinations, which they claim are necessary
to detect latent diseases or ailments that might later develop as a
2
result of toxic exposure.”
This novel theory of recovery is
1. Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Mich. 2005).
2. Daniel L. Martens & Ernest J. Getto, Medical Monitoring and Class Actions,
17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 225, 225 (2003); see also Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525
A.2d 287, 308 (N.J. 1987) (stating a claim for medical monitoring expenses “seeks
to recover the cost of periodic medical examinations intended to monitor

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/14

2

Aberson: A Fifty-state Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the M
13ABERSON.DOC

2006]

4/5/2006 1:35:02 PM

FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF MEDICAL MONITORING

1097

3

frequently labeled “medical monitoring.”
Plaintiffs bringing
claims for medical monitoring “seek post-exposure, pre-symptom
recovery for the expense of periodic medical examinations to
4
detect the onset of physical harm.” Plaintiffs who bring actions
seeking the establishment of a medical monitoring fund may not
suffer any current physical injuries and often do not even exhibit
5
symptoms of disease as a result of their alleged exposure.
Many courts are “tempted to permit recovery for medical
monitoring because the claims have ‘emotional and political
appeal’ and [because] our society has developed a ‘heightened
6
sensitivity to environmental issues.’” Thus, some courts across the
country have permitted recovery for medical monitoring absent
7
present physical injury.
Other jurisdictions, however, have
rejected recovery for medical monitoring absent present physical
injury because of the “inherent complexities and significant public

plaintiffs’ health and facilitate early diagnosis and treatment of disease caused by
plaintiffs’ exposure to toxic chemicals”).
3. Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Expense of Medical
Monitoring to Detect or Prevent Future Disease or Condition, 17 A.L.R. 5th 327 (2005).
Medical monitoring is also sometimes referred to as “medical surveillance.” Id.
4. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring—Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1999); see also Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82
S.W.3d 849, 856 (Ky. 2002) (“Under this theory, a defendant is required to pay a
plaintiff for the anticipated costs of checkups and procedures aimed at detection
and early treatment of any disease that may arise in the future as a result of
tortious exposure.”). The claim for medical surveillance is distinct from a claim
for so-called “enhanced risk.” The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Ayers has been
frequently quoted, explaining the difference as “[t]he enhanced risk claim seeks a
damage award, not because of any expenditure of funds, but because plaintiffs
contend that the unquantified injury to their health and life expectancy should be
presently compensable, even though no evidence of disease is manifest.” 525 A.2d
at 304. On the other hand, “the claim for medical surveillance . . . seeks specific
monetary damages measured by the cost of periodic medical examinations . . . [to]
redress . . . the fact that plaintiffs have been advised to spend money for medical
tests, a cost they would not have incurred absent their exposure to toxic
chemicals.” Id.
5. Martens & Getto, supra note 2, at 225.
6. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1059 (quoting Susan L. Martin & Jonathan
D. Martin, Tort Actions for Medical Monitoring: Warranted or Wasteful?, 20 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 121, 121 (1995)); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress,
and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 837 (2002) (“Another reason for the
intuitive appeal of medical monitoring claims is that asbestos and other toxic
substances have come to epitomize the evils of ruthless industrial technology in
the public eye, and the plaintiffs are quintessentially innocent victims of
wrongdoing.”).
7. See infra Part IV.A.
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8

policy concerns” surrounding the awards. Finally, others have yet
9
to rule on the issue.
This Note begins by tracing the evolution of medical
10
monitoring, including a discussion of the leading cases. It then
11
Next,
examines Minnesota’s treatment of medical monitoring.
this Note evaluates the state of medical monitoring in various other
12
states and jurisdictions.
This Note further discusses the
competing policy perspectives supporting various tests for medical
13
monitoring. Finally, it suggests the proper standard for the review
of medical monitoring issues in Minnesota, while encouraging
14
Minnesota courts to leave the issue to the legislature altogether.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL MONITORING
One of the “fundamental principles” of tort law over the past
two hundred plus years has been the theory that liability should not
15
be imposed without proof of a physical injury. The reason for this
injury requirement is to “give security to the rights of individuals by
putting within their reach suitable redress whenever their rights
16
have been actually violated.” Thus, tort law provides relief to an
individual under general tort theory only when they have suffered
17
an actual injury to person or property.
8. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1059; see infra Part IV.B.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Parts V-VI.
14. See infra Parts VI-VII.
15. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed.
1971); see also Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 688-89 (Mich. 2005)
(explaining that a present physical injury is required in the toxic tort context to
recover under a negligence theory); Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1074 (“For
over two hundred years, a fundamental principle of tort law has been that liability
should only be imposed when a person has suffered an injury.”).
16. COOLEY ON TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1932).
17. See Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 689. More eloquently stated:
Before any violation has in fact taken place, the law assumes that none
will happen; but that each individual will respect the rights of all others.
Therefore, it does not undertake in general to provide preventive
remedies; it gives them in a few exceptional cases, which stand on
peculiar grounds, and in which the mischiefs flowing from an invasion of
rights might be such as would be incapable of complete redress in the
ordinary methods, or perhaps in any manner. In most cases it is assumed
that, if the law places within the reach of every one a suitable remedy to
which he may resort when he suffers an injury, it has thereby not only
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While this narrow principle may appear harsh, especially when
examining some sympathetic plaintiffs, “it is the best filter the
courts have been able to develop to prevent a flood of claims, to
provide faster access to courts for those with ‘reliable and serious’
18
claims, and to ensure that defendants are held liable only for
19
genuine harm.” Medical monitoring claims that are brought by
plaintiffs lacking present physical injury challenge this traditional
20
The following three cases
“physical injury” rule in tort law.
illustrate how some courts have handled the issue of medical
monitoring.
A. Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
The first case to award medical monitoring damages was
21
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. In Friends for
All Children, Lockheed’s airplane was used in a rescue mission to
evacuate Vietnamese children from Saigon near the end of the
22
Vietnam War. Soon after takeoff, a locking system failed, causing
23
the cargo doors and aft ramp to fall off the aircraft. In addition,
the interior compartments of the plane decompressed resulting in
24
a loss of oxygen.
The plane later crashed, breaking into four
25
large pieces and several smaller pieces. Many of the orphans were
26
killed, although 149 of the infants survived.
An organization named Friends for All Children (FFAC),
claiming to be the legal guardian for the surviving children, filed a
claim in the United States District Court for the District of
provided for him adequate protection, but has given him all that public
policy demands. The remedies that are aimed at wrongs not yet
committed but only threatened, are so susceptible of abuse that they are
wisely restricted within very narrow limits.
COOLEY ON TORTS, supra note 16, § 32, quoted in Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 689.
18. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 444 (1997).
19. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1059.
20. Id.
21. 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
22. Id. at 819. The rescue mission, nicknamed “Operation Babylift,” took
place on April 4, 1975. Id. The Lockheed C5A Galaxy aircraft took off for the
United States with 301 passengers on board, mostly Vietnamese infant orphans.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The surviving orphans were later sent to San Francisco where they
were examined by U.S. military physicians, and subsequently released to their
adoptive parents. Id.
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27

Columbia.
FFAC alleged that the accident resulted from
28
Lockheed’s negligent manufacture of the plane. FFAC further
claimed that because of the decompression and the crash itself, the
29
survivors suffered from a neurological development disorder.
Thus, FFAC sought compensation from Lockheed for diagnostic
examinations and continued medical monitoring to determine if
the decompression or the crash itself caused residual brain
30
dysfunction syndrome in the children.
The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor
31
of the orphan children adopted by non-U.S. parents. In doing so,
the court held that Lockheed was liable for the cost of diagnostic
32
examinations of the children.
The court also entered an
injunction ordering Lockheed to create a $450,000 fund from
which reasonable costs of diagnostic examinations for the children
33
living in France could be drawn. Lockheed appealed, arguing in
part that tort law in the District of Columbia had not recognized a
cause of action for placing a person at risk in the absence of proof
34
of actual physical injury.
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia first noted that the law of the District of Columbia was
in fact “silent on the specific issue of whether a plaintiff may
maintain an action for diagnostic examinations in the absence of
35
proof that he or she was physically injured.” The court, however,
27. Id.
28. Id. Lockheed in turn argued that the crash was caused by the negligent
maintenance and operation of the plane by the U.S. Air Force. Id. at 819-20.
Thus, Lockheed decided to implead the United States as a third party defendant.
Id. at 820.
29. Id. at 819.
The brain disorder was classified as Minimal Brain
Dysfunction, or MBD. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 822. Half of the adoptive parents were Europeans. Id. at 819.
32. Id. The court stated it could not “be reasonably disputed that the need
for some diagnostic examinations . . . is itself a proximate result of this particular
crash.” Id.
33. Id. at 818-19. While the foreign plaintiffs lived in a number of European
countries, the court concluded that because the public health services in countries
other than France were likely to pay for the examinations, the relief in the form of
the fund should apply only to the French plaintiffs. Id. at 822 n.7.
34. Id. at 823. Lockheed further argued that “if the District of Columbia
courts were presented with this action they likewise would decline as a matter of
law to recognize it.” Id. at 824.
35. Id. Because the action was a diversity case, the court was obligated to
apply the law of the District of Columbia. See Anchorage-Hynning & Co. v.
Moringiello, 697 F.2d 356, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The principle set forth in Erie
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went on to predict that, if faced with the same question under
similar circumstances, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
would recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring in the
36
absence of physical injury. The court stated that its conclusion
was supported by two fundamental purposes of tort law: “the
deterrence of misconduct and the provision of just compensation
37
to victims of wrongdoing.”
To aid in its determination of whether a cause of action for
diagnostic examinations without proof of physical injury should
exist, the court hypothesized an accident involving two individuals,
38
Smith and Jones. The court stated:
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is
riding through a red light. Jones lands on his head with
some force. Understandably shaken, Jones enters a
hospital where doctors recommend that he undergo a
battery of tests to determine whether he has suffered any
internal head injuries. The tests prove negative, but Jones
sues Smith solely for what turns out to be the substantial
39
cost of the diagnostic examinations.
The court noted that, based on this example, even though
there is an absence of physical injury, Jones should still be able to
recover the costs for the diagnostic examinations proximately
40
caused by Smith’s actions. The court similarly reasoned that here
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) applies to federal courts in the District
of Columbia when they exercise jurisdiction over state-created causes of action. Id.
36. Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 824-25. The court reasoned that
general principles of tort law and the law of other jurisdictions supported its
conclusion. Id. The court also concluded that the need for medical monitoring
constituted an “injury” as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at
826. The Restatement defines “injury” as “the invasion of any legally protected
interest of another.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965). The court
reasoned that because “an individual has an interest in avoiding expensive
diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in avoiding physical
injury,” when a person invades that interest such person “should make the plaintiff
whole by paying for the examinations.” Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 826.
37. Id. at 825. The court also distinguished the cases from other jurisdictions
referenced by Lockheed because such jurisdictions’ refusals to recognize a cause
of action for diagnosis in the absence of present injury were grounded upon
difficulties of speculative proof, which were not present here. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The court noted that this conclusion will deter misconduct and
complies with the normative justice concerns applicable to tort law. Id. Because
the plaintiff’s need for medical services as a result of the accident was beyond the
services necessitated by normal life activities, the motorbiker should consequently
pay. Id.
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“no diagnostic examinations would be necessary ‘but for the fact
that these children endured explosive decompression and hypoxia
41
aboard [the] plane.’”
Despite its holding, the court of appeals was concerned with
the potential hardship its decision would impose on the
42
defendant.
To ensure that plaintiffs would be prevented from
recovering excessive damages, the court affirmed the order of the
district court creating a fund from which money could be disbursed
only upon submission of a voucher detailing the expenses
anticipated and upon the defendant having the opportunity to
43
respond to the potential disbursement. Moreover, in allowing a
claim for medical monitoring expenses absent physical injury, it
appears the court of appeals did not intend its decision to apply to
cases where the “alleged injury to be compensated [is] speculative
44
without the corroborative presence of physical injury.”
B.

Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley

In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, the United
States Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether a
railroad worker, negligently exposed to asbestos but without
symptoms of any disease, could recover under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for negligently inflicted emotional
45
distress.
In Metro-North, the plaintiff worked as a pipefitter for Metro46
North, a railroad. For a period of three years, and for a time of
roughly one hour per working day, the plaintiff’s job required him
47
to remove insulation from pipes.
After completing such work
plaintiff would often be covered with insulation dust containing
48
asbestos.
After attending an “asbestos awareness” class, the
49
plaintiff feared he would develop cancer as a result of his work.
He then sought periodic medical checkups for cancer and
asbestosis, but those examinations did not reveal evidence of

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 825 (quoting the district court’s Memorandum of Opinion).
Id. at 837-38.
Id. at 838 & n.42.
Id. at 826.
521 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1997).
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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50

asbestos-related disease.
The plaintiff subsequently brought suit against Metro-North
51
under FELA. Specifically, he sought damages for his emotional
52
distress and to cover the expenses of future medical monitoring.
In response, Metro-North argued, inter alia, that FELA did not
permit the plaintiff to recover for injuries because he had not
53
suffered physical harm.
The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, holding that
the plaintiff did not “offer sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find
54
that he suffered a real emotional injury.” The court also stated
that the plaintiff suffered no “physical impact,” and therefore, any
emotional injury suffered by the plaintiff fell outside the
55
circumstances under which FELA permits recovery. The court did
56
not address the plaintiff’s medical monitoring claim.
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the judgment and held
that the plaintiff’s contact with the insulation dust fit within the
57
definition of “physical impact” under FELA. Thus, the court held
that the plaintiff could recover under FELA for any accompanying
58
emotional distress.
The court found that the plaintiff could
recover only if he could prove that “by reason of the exposure to
the toxic substance caused by the defendant’s negligence, a
reasonable physician would prescribe . . . a monitoring regime
different than the one that would have been prescribed in the
59
absence of that particular exposure.” The plaintiff might then
60
recover the costs of his medical checkups.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
61
Second Circuit holding. The first question before the Court was
whether the plaintiff’s physical contact with the dust amounted to
“physical impact” for purposes of the plaintiff’s emotional distress
50. Id.
51. Id. Under FELA, a railroad worker may recover damages for an “injury
. . . resulting . . . from” his employer’s “negligence.” 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2000).
52. Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 427.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 428.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Buckley v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 79 F.3d 1337, 1345 (2d Cir.
1996).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1347 (internal quotation omitted).
60. Id.
61. Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 428.
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62

claim pursuant to FELA. The Court held that “physical impact”
does not include slight contact with a substance where the only
physical harm is that the substance may cause a disease in the
63
future.
More important to the topic of this Note, the Court also
addressed the question of whether the plaintiff could recover the
cost of future medical checkups he expected to incur to monitor
64
for potential asbestos-related disease. By a vote of seven to two,
the Court denied the plaintiff’s request for medical monitoring
65
damages under FELA. The Court noted a number of concerns
with allowing such a claim absent physical injury, including (1) the
fact that distinguishing medical monitoring costs from the costs of
66
routine medical care would be problematic for judges and juries;
(2) the notion that allowing recovery would soak up medical
67
resources better left to “those more seriously harmed”; and (3)
the fact that allowing such recovery would “ignore the presence of
existing alternative sources of payment,” such as employers or
insurance policies that may provide monitoring, leaving courts
68
uncertain when calculating recoveries.
The Court was also concerned that such a remedy would
produce a “flood” of cases and result in “unlimited and
69
unpredictable liability.”
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer
stated that the majority were “troubled . . . by the potential systemic
70
effects of creating a new, full-blown, tort law cause of action.”

62. Id. at 428-29.
63. Id. at 430. The Court noted:
[T]he words “physical impact” do not encompass every form of “physical
contact.” . . . [T]hey do not include a contact that amounts to no more
than an exposure . . . to a substance that poses some future risk of disease
. . . and which contact causes emotional distress only because the worker
learns that he may become ill after a substantial period of time.
Id. at 432.
64. Id. at 438.
65. Id. at 443-44.
66. Id. at 441.
67. Id. at 442.
68. Id. at 442-43.
69. Id. at 442. The Court was concerned that “tens of millions of individuals
may have suffered exposure to substances that might justify some form of
substance-exposure-related medical monitoring.” Id.
70. Id. at 443-44. The Court noted the likely effects on potential plaintiffs not
before the court but who “depend on a system that can distinguish between
reliable and serious claims . . . and unreliable and relatively trivial claims.” Id. at
444.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/14

10

Aberson: A Fifty-state Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the M
13ABERSON.DOC

2006]

4/5/2006 1:35:02 PM

FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF MEDICAL MONITORING

1105

C. Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
Despite the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Metro-North,
in 1999, West Virginia’s Supreme Court of Appeals became the
most recent state court to recognize a cause of action for medical
71
monitoring absent present physical injury. In Bower, the plaintiffs
brought a claim in the Circuit Court of Marion County, West
Virginia, alleging they were exposed to a number of toxic
substances because defendants maintained a cullet pile containing
72
debris from the manufacture of light bulbs. The plaintiffs sought,
among other things, damages in the form of medical monitoring
73
expenses. At the time the plaintiffs brought suit, none exhibited
74
symptoms of disease related to their potential exposure.
The defendants removed the case to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia and later moved to
75
dismiss the plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim. The plaintiffs
subsequently sought to certify to the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals the issue of whether medical monitoring damages were
76
a recognized form of relief under West Virginia tort law. The
district court asked the supreme court of appeals to resolve the
following question: “In a case of negligent infliction of emotional
distress absent physical injury, may a party assert a claim for
expenses related to future medical monitoring necessitated solely
by fear of contracting a disease from exposure to toxic
77
chemicals?” In order to reach its holding on the issue of medical
monitoring, however, the Bower court reformulated the certified
question to read: “Whether, under West Virginia law, a plaintiff
who does not allege a present physical injury can assert a claim for
the recovery of future medical monitoring costs where such
damages are the proximate result of defendant’s tortious
78
conduct.”
71. Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 1999).
72. Id. at 426. The tests performed on the pile indicated the presence of
thirty potentially toxic substances. Id. at 427.
73. Id. Plaintiffs brought claims for: (1) negligent maintenance and
operation of the refuse pile, (2) nuisance, (3) trespass, (4) negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and (5) intentional disregard for the health and safety of
plaintiffs. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 427-28.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 428-29. The court noted that it did not believe the district court
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The court held that a present physical harm was not a
79
prerequisite to bring a claim for medical monitoring. The court
further noted that a plaintiff seeking medical monitoring costs is
not even required to show a “probable likelihood that a serious
80
disease will result from the exposure.” Rather, all a plaintiff must
prove is that medical monitoring expenses are “necessary and
reasonably certain to be incurred as a proximate result of a
81
defendant’s tortious conduct.”
After determining that future medical monitoring expenses
are available pursuant to West Virginia law absent a present
physical injury, the court set forth the following six-part test
necessary for a plaintiff to sustain an action for medical monitoring
costs under West Virginia law:
(1) [a plaintiff] . . . has . . . been significantly exposed; (2)
to a proven hazardous substance; (3) through the tortious
conduct of the defendant; (4) as a proximate result of the
exposure, plaintiff has suffered an increased risk of
contracting a serious latent disease; (5) the increased risk
of disease makes it reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to
undergo periodic diagnostic medical examinations
different from what would be prescribed in the absence of
the exposure; and (6) monitoring procedures exist that
82
make the early detection of a disease possible.
Justice Maynard dissented in Bower, arguing that the majority
lacked the authority to create a medical monitoring cause of action
83
absent a present physical injury. Specifically, Justice Maynard was
troubled that the court went beyond the “clear, concise and limited
question” of the district court in an effort to satisfy the court’s
84
“grand designs . . . despite the specific issue before it.” Justice
Maynard was more disturbed, however, that the majority’s decision
to engage in judicial lawmaking violated the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers by “usurping the Legislature’s authority to
85
enact laws.” Finally, Justice Maynard criticized the majority for
meant “to pose such a narrow question.” Id. at 428. Thus, the court used its
power under West Virginia Code sections 51-1A-1 through 51-1A-13 to reformulate
the question. Id.
79. Id. at 430.
80. Id. at 431.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 432-33.
83. Id. at 434 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 434-35.
85. Id. at 435.
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rejecting the 200-year-old tort law rule requiring a present injury
before allowing a plaintiff to recover damages, electing instead to
favor a rule emphasizing “the speculative and amorphous showing
86
of ‘increased risk.’”
III. MINNESOTA CASE LAW DISCUSSING MEDICAL MONITORING
Before analyzing the test that should be adopted by the
Minnesota Supreme Court, it is important to briefly highlight
previous Minnesota case law. To date, the law of medical
monitoring in Minnesota is rather undeveloped. In fact, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of medical
monitoring and the Minnesota Court of Appeals has discussed the
issue only once.
A.

Werlein v. United States

The first case to address the issue of medical monitoring in
87
Minnesota was Werlein v. United States. In Werlein, the plaintiffs
brought suit against a number of defendants for allegedly
discharging chemical waste, including trichloroethylene (TCE),
from the Twin Cities Army Ammunition Plant (TCAAP) and the
88
“Trio Solvents” site. The plaintiffs lived near the two sites and
89
claimed that their water supply was polluted by the defendants.
The plaintiffs filed actions under federal and state statutes
90
governing toxic pollution. The plaintiffs also brought a number
91
of common-law claims.
In addition, the plaintiffs requested a
86. Id. Justice Maynard suggested that because a plaintiff is “not required to
show that a particular disease is certain or even likely to occur as a result of
exposure,” as a result of the majority’s decision “plaintiffs will . . . be compensated
when there is no injury, thus providing a windfall for plaintiffs.” Id.
87. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds, 793 F.
Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992).
88. Id. at 890.
89. Id.
90. Id. The plaintiffs stated claims under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675,
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992, the
Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376, the Minnesota Environmental
Response and Liability Act (MERLA), MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.01-115B.20, and the
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-116B.13.
Id. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief under these statutes, asking the court to
supervise the cleanup of contaminants at both sites. Id.
91. Id.
Plaintiffs sought liability for nuisance, trespass, battery, and
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. Pursuant to such
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medical monitoring fund, to be financed by the defendants, which
would reimburse the plaintiffs exposed to the contaminants for the
92
costs of medical screening. In response, the defendants brought
93
motions for summary judgment and dismissal.
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
held, inter alia, that medical monitoring costs could be recovered as
94
tort damages under the common law of Minnesota. The court
was careful to note, however, that the costs of medical monitoring
were available only where a plaintiff could show that they had a
95
present injury that increased their risk of future harm.
B.

Bryson v. Pillsbury Co.

The only instance of a Minnesota state court discussing the
96
issue of medical monitoring occurred in Bryson v. Pillsbury Co. In
97
Bryson, the plaintiff’s horse fell into a pit filled with storm water.
The pit was also allegedly used by the plaintiff’s employer, a
98
subsidiary of the defendant, to dispose of waste.
The plaintiff
entered the pit to rescue the horse and noticed Captan-treated
99
seeds floating in the water. After rescuing the horse, the plaintiff
100
later suffered from a recurring rash that covered her body.
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant as a
101
The plaintiff argued that her
result of her exposure to Captan.
exposure caused extensive chromosome breakage and an increased
102
risk of developing cancer.
The defendant moved for summary
judgment on the grounds of assumption of risk and speculative

claims, plaintiffs asked for monetary damages, including compensation for both
personal and property damages caused by the contaminants. Id. at 890-91.
92. Id. at 891. Plaintiffs contended that medical monitoring expenses could
be recovered both as a response cost under CERCLA section 107 and under the
common law. Id. at 901.
93. Id. at 890.
94. Id. at 904.
95. Id. The court stated that when a plaintiff can show they have present
injuries that increase the risk of future harm, “monitoring is . . . a [recoverable]
future medical cost.” Id.
96. 573 N.W.2d 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
97. Id. at 719.
98. Id.
99. Id. Captan is a chemical treatment for seed designed to protect the seed
from insects when placed in the soil. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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103

damages.
The district court granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on the damages issue, because the plaintiff
suffered no present injury and thus awarding damages for future
104
harm was too speculative.
On appeal, the defendant argued that because the plaintiff’s
alleged chromosome damage was asymptomatic, no present injury
105
existed.
Moreover, the defendant’s expert testified that “an
elevated number of chromosome aberrations [is] not considered
an ‘injury’ per se because they do not in and of themselves result in
106
any physical impairment.”
The plaintiff contended that the
chromosome breakage resulting from her exposure to Captan was
107
a “real and present physical and biologic injury.”
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, stating that
the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine factual
issue as to whether the plaintiff’s chromosome breakage
108
In doing so, the court quoted
constituted a present injury.
Werlein, stating that “it could not rule as a matter of law that
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries [were] not ‘real’ simply because they
[were] subcellular” and that “[i]t is for the trier of fact, aided by
expert testimony, to determine whether the plaintiffs have suffered
109
present harm.”
For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to note that
although the court held that the determination of whether
subcellular damage actually constituted a present physical injury is
one for the trier of fact, the court did require a present physical
injury to pursue medical monitoring costs.
C. Thompson v. American Tobacco Co.
110

In Thompson v. American Tobacco Co., the plaintiffs brought a
claim alleging that the defendants participated in a large-scale
fraudulent scheme to encourage people to either begin or
111
continue smoking.
The plaintiffs further alleged that the
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id. at 720-21.
Id. at 721.
189 F.R.D. 544 (D. Minn. 1999).
Id. at 547.
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defendants’ scheme exposed them to diseases and illnesses, and
required the plaintiffs to participate in medical monitoring
112
programs.
Thus, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’
conduct constituted both common law and statutory fraud, and
sought the establishment of a court-administered defendant113
funded medical monitoring fund.
The plaintiffs subsequently brought motions for class
114
certification and to reserve individual injury and damage claims.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota held, in
relevant part, that the plaintiffs’ request for medical monitoring
115
presented too many individual issues to permit certification.
In
so holding, the court stated “[g]iven the novelty of the tort of
medical monitoring and that the Minnesota Supreme Court has yet
to recognize it as an independent theory of recovery, this Court is
not inclined at this time to find that such a tort exists under
116
Minnesota law.”
D. In re St. Jude Medical, Inc. Silzone Heart Valves Products
Liability Litigation
Minnesota’s status as a state that requires the presence of a
physical injury in seeking the recovery of medical monitoring costs
117
In St.
was most recently confirmed in In re St. Jude Medical, Inc.
Jude, the defendant manufactured the “Silzone” valve, an artificial
118
heart valve.
After the Food and Drug Administration approved
the Silzone valve, it was implanted into more than 10,000 people in
119
the United States.
After the valve’s safety was called into
120
Shortly
question, the defendant issued a voluntary recall.
thereafter, individuals who alleged they had either been harmed by
the Silzone valve, or who had the valve but did not have symptoms,

112. Id.
113. Id. Plaintiffs brought statutory claims pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
sections 325F.67, 325F.68, 325F.69, and 325D.43. Id.
114. See id. at 548.
115. Id. at 552.
116. Id. However, for the purposes of ruling on plaintiffs’ class certification
motion, the court “assumed that medical monitoring [was] a proper theory of
recovery.” Id.
117. No. MDL 01-1396, 2004 WL 45504 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004).
118. Id. at *1.
119. St. Jude, 2004 WL 45504, at *1.
120. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/14

16

Aberson: A Fifty-state Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the M
13ABERSON.DOC

2006]

4/5/2006 1:35:02 PM

FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF MEDICAL MONITORING

1111

121

brought a number of lawsuits against St. Jude Medical.
The plaintiffs subsequently brought a motion seeking the
122
certification of two classes.
Class I included every patient in the
United States who at the time of the claim had the Silzone valve
123
implanted. This class was designated the “monitoring” class, and
124
sought injunctive relief in the form of medical monitoring. Class
II consisted of all people in the United States who received a
125
Silzone valve and sustained physical injuries due to the valve.
126
This class was designated the “injury” class, and sought damages.
On March 27, 2003, the court conditionally certified Classes I
and II pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
127
Procedure. The court requested additional briefing on potential
subclasses because the court anticipated creating subclasses to
128
address any substantial differences in state law.
The Class I plaintiffs sought to recover the expenses of future
medical examinations intended to detect the onset of injuries
129
arising from the Silzone heart valve.
To that end, the Class I
plaintiffs sought a medical monitoring program, paid for through a
trust account funded by St. Jude Medical, and designed to monitor
130
side effects associated with defective valves.
After considering the parties’ additional briefing and after
hearing extensive arguments, the court concluded it would
131
continue “to manage the monitoring class as a class action.” The
121. Id. On April 18, 2001, these cases were consolidated and transferred to
the U.S. District Court in the State of Minnesota by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, for consolidated pretrial
proceedings. Id.
122. St. Jude, 2004 WL 45504, at *1.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. Specifically, referring to FED. R. CIV. P. 23, the court found that both
Class I and II met the threshold requirements set forth in Rule 23(a), that
common issues of law and fact predominated, and that a class action was the best
way to adjudicate the claims. Id. As a result, the court conditionally certified the
claims under Rules 23(b)(3) and (c)(4), and conditionally certified the medical
monitoring claims of Class I under Rule 23(b)(2). Id.
128. Id. at *2.
129. Id. at *4.
130. Id. Plaintiffs also desired the program to include an epidemiological
component “to collect data and study the effects of the Silzone valves.” Id.
131. Id. The court justified its decision, arguing that monitoring claims are
typically smaller in value than personal injury claims, “and are closer to the
‘negative value’ lawsuits that class actions were intended to encompass.” Id. Other
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court did recognize, however, that it must predict how each state
would address medical monitoring claims, and that a “consequence
of this sub-classing is that class members who are asymptomatic and
whose claims arise in jurisdictions that require injury for a tort
action to proceed will have to be excluded from the class
132
entirely.”
Despite this fact, the court determined that the
differences in state laws of those states recognizing medical
monitoring as a stand-alone claim did not undermine the medical
133
monitoring class.
In evaluating the status of medical monitoring law in each
state, “the Court recognize[d] . . . that medical monitoring law is
134
not a well-established cause of action.”
Further, the court stated
that because Minnesota is a state that recognizes medical
monitoring but imposes an “injury” requirement, the individuals
whose valves were implanted in Minnesota were not to be included
135
in Class I.
Six months later, however, the court changed its mind. In a
commentators have similarly described the role of class actions in mass tort cases
as a “vehicle” for small value claimants to combine their claims so as to ensure that
bringing such claims is economically feasible. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:
The Dilemma of Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1350 (1995). The
court did, however, note “that some courts have been reluctant to certify medical
monitoring classes,” especially those “involving exposure to environmental toxins
and over-the-counter drugs.” St. Jude, 2004 WL 45504, at *4. The court
contended, however, that “[t]he rationale for such hesitancy” was “not applicable”
in this case, because “[u]nlike claims involving uncertain levels of exposure and an
uncertain number of potential individuals exposed,” here “the medical
monitoring class [was] certain and discrete.” Id. The court also justified its
decision by noting that here the court would “not face issues of length or amount
of exposure” as it does in “cases involving environmental toxins.” Id. Finally, the
court stated that because it restricted the class “to include only asymptomatic
individuals,” the case did “not present issues of causation.” Id.
132. St. Jude, 2004 WL 45504, at *5 (citing In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig.,
Civ. No. A-98-20626, 1999 WL 673066, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1999)).
133. Id. This was because the states that do recognize medical monitoring as
an independent cause of action have elements that appear to be similar. Id.
(citing In re Baycol Prod. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197 (D. Minn. Sept. 17, 2003)). In
Baycol, the court decided against certifying a medical monitoring class because the
class representatives had previously received the requested testing and monitoring.
In re Baycol Prod. Litig., 218 F.R.D. at 211. In addition, the class representatives
had suffered injury, and thus the Baycol court was concerned the representatives
would not “adequately represent the interests of the uninjured class members.”
Id.; see also In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 287 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (certifying medical monitoring class and noting the only relevant variation
in state law is whether an injury is required).
134. St. Jude, 2004 WL 45504, at *6.
135. Id. at *8-9.
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separate proceeding of In re St. Jude Medical, Inc., the plaintiffs
argued that individuals with a Silzone valve did have present
136
physical injuries in the form of subcellular injuries.
Thus, such
individuals met the injury requirement in jurisdictions that did not
137
The
allow medical monitoring absent present physical injury.
court decided to include states in the class, as a separate subclass,
only if they had previously recognized subcellular damage as a
138
present injury.
Despite the fact that no Minnesota case has
expressly held that subcellular damage constitutes a present
physical injury, the court added individuals whose valves were
139
implanted in Minnesota.
St. Jude Medical appealed the district court’s decision to the
140
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
St. Jude Medical argued that
the district court erred by certifying the medical monitoring class,
141
in part, because of the “diverse legal and factual issues” present.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, and reversed the
142
district court’s certification of the medical monitoring class.
Following the lead of other courts around the country, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the number of individual
issues present in the medical monitoring class and the highly
individualized nature of each plaintiff’s need for medical
143
monitoring made class certification improper.

136. No. 01-1396, 2004 WL 1630786 (D. Minn. July 15, 2005).
137. Id. at *4.
138. Id. at *4-5.
139. Id. at *5. The court stated that its decision to add Minnesota to the class
was based on the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Bryson “that allegations
of chromosome damage presented a fact question for the jury on whether an
individual was ‘injured.’” Id. The court also decided to include the plaintiffs
whose valves were installed in Delaware “based on the Court’s revised analysis of
the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp., 480 A.2d
647, 651 (Del. 1984).” Id. In addition, the court included the plaintiffs whose
valves were implanted in Ohio based on Verbryke v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,
616 N.E.2d 1162 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). Id. The remaining states originally
excluded by the court because they required a present physical injury were not
added to the class because those jurisdictions had not previously recognized that
subcellular damage may constitute an “injury.” Id.
140. In re St. Jude Medical Inc., 425 F.3d 1116 (8th Cir. 2005).
141. Id. at 1121.
142. Id. at 1122-23.
143. Id. at 1122. For example, considerations such as a plaintiff’s medical
history, condition of heart valves at the time of implantation, risk factors, general
health, and personal choice, all beg an individualized inquiry. Id.
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IV. STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY ON THE LAW OF MEDICAL MONITORING
Currently, courts in at least thirteen states plus the District of
Columbia and Guam recognize medical monitoring absent present
physical injury. Further, courts in sixteen states plus the Virgin
Islands appear to allow medical monitoring only if the plaintiffs can
show present physical injury. The remaining jurisdictions either
have not articulated a test or have not addressed the issue of
medical monitoring. The tables below categorize the states based
on the present physical injury requirement (or lack thereof). It is
important to note that some states permit a cause of action for
medical monitoring, while other states only allow medical
monitoring as a remedy for an existing common law or statutory
tort. See the Appendix in Part IX for a short summary of the
relevant authority for each state.
A. States That Allow Medical Monitoring in the Absence of Present
Physical Injury
State
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
District of
Columbia
Florida
Guam
Illinois
Montana
New Jersey

144.

Authority
Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d
795 (Cal. 1993)
Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468
(D. Colo. 1991)
Martin v. Shell Oil Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 313 (D.
Conn. 2002)
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed
144
Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
Abuan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1116 (1994)
Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2003)
Lamping v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., No. DV-9785786 (Mont. 4th Dist. Ct. Feb. 2, 2000)
Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J.
1987)

See also supra Part II.A.
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Ohio
Pennsylvania
Utah
West Virginia
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Patton v. Gen. Signal Corp., 984 F. Supp. 666
(W.D.N.Y. 1997)
Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army,
696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997)
Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply, 858 P.2d 970
(Utah 1993)
Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d
145
424 (W. Va. 1999)

B. States That Do Not Allow Medical Monitoring Absent a Present
Physical Injury
State
Alabama
Delaware
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska

Nevada

145.
146.

Authority
Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So.
2d 827 (Ala. 2001)
Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp., 480 A.2d 647
(Del. 1984)
Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 70 F.3d 951
(7th Cir. 1995)
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F.
Supp. 1515 (D. Kan. 1995)
Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky.
2002)
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 2004)
Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684
(Mich. 2005)
Bryson v. Pillsbury Co., 573 N.W.2d 718 (Minn.
146
Ct. App. 1998)
Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846 F. Supp.
1400 (W.D. Mo. 1994)
Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir.
2000), abrogated on procedural grounds by Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 125 S. Ct.
2611 (2005)
Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435 (Nev.
2001)

See also supra Part II.C.
See also supra Part III.
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North Carolina
South Carolina

Texas

Virginia
Virgin Islands
Washington

[Vol. 32:3

Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990
WL 312969 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990)
Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., No. CIV.A. 9:99-228018RB, 2001 WL 34010613 (D.S.C. Mar. 20,
2001)
Norwood v. Raytheon Co., No. EP-04-CA-127PRM, 2006 WL 267335 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17,
2006)
Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992)
Purjet v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., Civ. No.
1985/284, 1986 WL 1200 (V.I. Jan. 8, 1996)
Duncan v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601
(W.D. Wash. 2001)

C. States That Have Either Not Addressed the Issue of Medical
Monitoring or Have Not Articulated a Test
State
Arkansas
Maryland
Puerto Rico
Tennessee
Alaska
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Maine
Massachusetts
Mississippi
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/14

Authority
Baker v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Div., 992 S.W.2d
797 (Ark. 1999)
Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200
(Md. 2000)
Barreras Ruiz v. Am. Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D.
194 (D.P.R. 1998)
Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174 F.R.D. 396 (M.D.
Tenn. 1996)
Medical monitoring issue not addressed
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South Dakota
Vermont
Wisconsin
Wyoming
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR ALLOWING MEDICAL MONITORING
ABSENT PRESENT PHYSICAL INJURY
In states that allow recovery for medical monitoring without
demonstrating present physical injury, the substantive question to
be answered is: “Should courts allow plaintiffs to recover based on
the possibility of future injuries by imposing on defendants the
current costs of medically monitoring those persons placed at
147
increased risk?” A number of courts have answered this question
affirmatively, setting forth policy arguments in support of their
decision to allow medical monitoring absent some present physical
injury.
148
In Bower, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals set
forth four frequently cited public policy considerations, originally
identified by the California Supreme Court in Potter v. Firestone Tire
149
& Rubber Co., that favor the recognition of medical monitoring
claims absent present physical injury: (1) allowing recovery fosters
access to medical testing and facilitates early diagnosis and
150
treatment, (2) recognizing medical monitoring claims deters
irresponsible distribution of toxic substances, (3) early monitoring
may prevent future costs and reduce the potential liability of the
151
tortfeasor, and (4) medical monitoring satisfies basic notions of
fairness by assuring that wrongfully exposed plaintiffs recover the
costs of medical treatment.
152
Henderson and Twerski
have briefly addressed this
153
analysis. They argue that the first and third policy reasons stated
147. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 842.
148. Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 1999).
149. See 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993).
150. See also Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987) (noting
that early diagnosis and treatment is especially valuable for cancer patients, where
delay in diagnosis often increases risks to the patient).
151. See also id. at 312 (granting the plaintiffs a monitoring remedy that
potentially prevents future disease may “reduce the overall costs to the responsible
parties”).
152. Henderson and Twerski are tort scholars and reporters for the American
Law Institute’s Restatement of Torts, Third: Products Liability.
153. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 842-43.
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above are the same, because both go to the idea that medical
monitoring helps prevent disease, which consequently benefits all
154
other parties in the chain. Further, they contend that the second
policy rationale offered above “is valid only if one assumes that the
social costs of any given exposure to asbestos or other toxic
substance can, in the absence of physical injury, be determined
155
fairly and accurately.”
In addition, the deterrence concern fails
to consider the fact that in some instances the practices that result
in a plaintiff’s claim for medical monitoring damages, such as
distribution or dumping of toxic substances that took place years
ago, were legal at the time they occurred, and, most importantly,
have already been terminated by the defendant. Finally, the Bower
court’s fourth policy justification “clearly begs the question of why
justice is necessarily served by allowing, through the back door,
156
recoveries that courts will not allow in through the front.”
VI. STRONG ARGUMENTS SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT
MINNESOTA SHOULD REQUIRE A PRESENT PHYSICAL INJURY TO
ESTABLISH A CLAIM FOR MEDICAL MONITORING DAMAGES
As previously discussed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not
yet addressed the issue of medical monitoring. However, both the
Minnesota Court of Appeals and the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota have properly determined that a present
physical injury is required to establish a claim for medical
monitoring expenses.
As noted above, some courts and commentators make policy
arguments in support of the idea that recovery of medical
monitoring expenses should be allowed absent present physical
injury.
To be sure, these are solid and persuasive policy
considerations that deserve legitimate consideration. On balance,
however, the policy concerns for denying medical monitoring
154. Id. at 843 n.172.
155. Id. at 843. In addition, other commentators have noted that “[f]orcing
defendants to internalize unmatured risk in the nature of medical monitoring
expenses . . . raises serious concerns of overdeterrence.” Andrew R. Klein,
Rethinking Medical Monitoring, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 27 (1998); see, e.g., Martin &
Martin, supra note 6, at 142-43 (“[C]reating a new cause of action for medical
monitoring that eliminates one of the traditional elements of tort actions does not
seem warranted. Its deterrent value is negligible; its compensatory function
should be rendered moot by changes in the health care system; and the costs of
subsequent litigation will exceed the benefits obtained.”).
156. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 843.
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absent present physical injury clearly outweigh any opposing
concerns. Thus, when faced with the issue, the Minnesota
Supreme Court should require a present physical injury to establish
a claim for medical monitoring damages.
This standard strikes the appropriate balance between
competing policy concerns because it still provides the ability to
seek compensation for medical monitoring expenses to plaintiffs
who suffer an actual, present physical injury from exposure to
toxins. Moreover, the position that the Supreme Court of
Minnesota should reject medical monitoring in the absence of
present physical injury is a position supported by both the United
States Supreme Court (under FELA) and a growing number of
commentators for some of the reasons highlighted below.
A. Courts Encounter Administrative Problems in Medical Monitoring
Cases
The process of actually distributing potentially millions of
dollars in medical monitoring awards is one at which courts are not
well equipped. Monitoring funds to be used by large numbers of
people require court administration and do not guarantee that
157
potential victims actually receive testing.
Moreover, lump-sum
158
awards might not actually be used for medical costs.
Complicating the court’s distribution of funds is the fact that
“most monitoring systems established to accomplish marginal
improvements would duplicate systems set up for similar
159
purposes.”
For example, many monitoring recipients may have
some form of health insurance that will cover the costs of
157. Id. at 844.
158. Id.; see also Klein, supra note 155, at 24 (“[F]ew (if any) medical
monitoring proponents suggest that courts award lump-sum damages to plaintiffs,
presumably because they fear that plaintiffs will spend the money on goods and
services other than medical surveillance.”); Arvin Maskin et. al., Medical Monitoring:
A Viable Remedy for Deserving Plaintiffs or Tort Law’s Most Expensive Consolation Prize?,
27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 521, 541-42 (2000) (describing relevant data on
plaintiffs’ use of medical monitoring awards). As a result, some ask that recoveries
for monitoring expenses go to fund court-administered programs as opposed to
being paid directly to plaintiffs. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 844; see
also Maskin et al., supra, at 543 (advocating limiting recovery to a medical fund);
Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future
Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 665-66
(1992) (explaining the periodic payment approach to dispersing medical
monitoring funds).
159. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 844.
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160

monitoring.
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Metro-North
additional impediments to a court’s decision to allow recovery of
the costs of medical monitoring, including (1) medical
professionals offer conflicting recommendations concerning which
treatments may be necessary, (2) individual plaintiffs’ unique
medical needs make pinpointing the reason for additional
monitoring difficult, and (3) medical surveillance is prudent for a
161
number of individuals even absent exposure to toxins.
B. Medical Monitoring Misuses the Resources of Defendants, the Courts,
and the Health Care System
Even though many defendants in medical monitoring actions
tend to be large businesses or government agencies, such
defendants “do not have an endless supply of financial
162
resources.” Thus, the natural result of such defendants having to
shell out large amounts of money to satisfy medical monitoring
judgments is that future victims who can demonstrate actual
injuries that require immediate medical attention may not be fully
163
compensated.
In addition, courts allowing monitoring claims absent present
physical injury will not have the resources or time necessary to deal
164
with large volumes of such claims.
This problem is exacerbated
by the fact that those jurisdictions that have recognized monitoring
claims absent present physical injury have not reached uniformity
regarding what elements and prerequisites are necessary to prove a

160. Id.; see also infra Part VII.A.
161. 521 U.S. 424, 441-42 (1997).
162. Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Ky. 2002); see also Henry
v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 696-97 (Mich. 2005) (“[J]udicial recognition
of a medical monitoring cause of action may do more harm than good . . . for
Michigan’s economy . . . .[There is] no assurance that a decision in plaintiffs’ favor
. . . will not wreak enormous harm on Michigan’s citizens and its economy.”);
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 844-45 (“[T]he serious negative impacts of
[medical monitoring] liability on the business firms involved cannot be doubted
. . . . [D]efendants in these medical monitoring cases face potentially crushing
liabilities.”).
163. Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 857.
164. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 846 (predicting that the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Bower brought upon the state a volume of
litigation “with which it is institutionally incapable of dealing” and where the
“institutional costs to the courts in that state will [likely] be very great”).
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165

monitoring claim.
Moreover, medical monitoring potentially wastes scarce
resources and clogs an already congested health care system, all the
while placing those being monitored at risk of surveillance-related
166
harm.
C. Medical Monitoring Absent Present Physical Injury Is Too FarReaching and Could Create a Potentially Limitless Pool of Plaintiffs and
Result in an Avalanche of Litigation
The U.S. Supreme Court in Metro-North stated:
[T]ens of millions of individuals may have suffered
exposure to substances that might justify some form of
substance-exposure-related medical monitoring . . . [a]nd
that fact, along with uncertainty as to the amount of
liability, could threaten both a “flood” of less important
cases (potentially absorbing resources better left available
to those more seriously harmed) and the systemic harms
that can accompany “unlimited and unpredictable
167
liability.”
Henderson and Twerski similarly wrote: “Given that
negligently distributed or discharged toxins can be perceived to lie
around every corner in the modern industrialized world, and their
effects on risk levels are at best speculative, the potential tort claims
168
involved are inherently limitless and endless.”
165. See Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 858.
166. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 844 (“[S]uch monitoring—
especially excessive monitoring––is not only wasteful of scarce resources, but often
places those being monitored at risk of surveillance-related harm.”); see also Henry,
701 N.W.2d at 694-95 (“Litigation of these preinjury claims could drain resources
needed to compensate those with manifest physical injuries and a more immediate
need for medical care . . . . It is less than obvious . . . that the benefits of a medical
monitoring cause of action would outweigh the burdens imposed on plaintiffs with
manifest injuries, our judicial system, and those responsible for administering and
financing medical care.”). See generally George W.C. McCarter, Medical SueVeillance: A History and Critique of the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 276-80 (1993).
167. 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997); see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at
845 (“If the past decade of asbestos litigation has taught us anything, it is that the
appetites of the plaintiff’s bar know no limits in the ongoing search for secondary
and even tertiary generations of defendants against whom to bring massive
collective actions on new and expanding legal theories.”).
168. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 844; see also Schwartz et al., supra
note 4, at 1072 (noting that people are exposed daily to health hazards “through
the air they breathe, water they drink, food and drugs they ingest, and on the land
on which they live”).
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This was the situation that developed in West Virginia after the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized in Bower a
cause of action for medical monitoring absent present physical
injury. A short time after the Bower decision, a class action was filed
against major cigarette manufacturers on behalf of 270,000 present
and former West Virginia smokers who had not been diagnosed
with any smoking-related diseases, but were seeking the creation
and funding by the defendants of a medical monitoring program
169
for the early detection of tobacco-related diseases.
In another
medical monitoring class action filed in West Virginia,
asymptomatic coal preparation plant workers from seven states
brought a claim against the suppliers of acrylamide, seeking
medical monitoring for the plaintiffs’ alleged exposure to the
170
Finally, in Carter v. Monsanto Co., a landowner filed a
chemical.
class action, seeking to recover the cost of inspecting and
monitoring his property for dioxin that had allegedly leaked from
171
landfills.
These three cases help illustrate the flood of litigation
and difficult line-drawing that has accompanied West Virginia’s
decision to allow medical monitoring absent present physical
172
injury.
D. Allowing Plaintiffs to Seek Medical Monitoring Damages Absent
Present Physical Injury Will Potentially Preclude such Plaintiffs’ Later
Claims when Injury Actually Develops
Under the doctrine of res judicata (or claim preclusion) a
judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or
their privies bars a subsequent suit based upon the same cause of

169. In re Tobacco Litigation (Medical Monitoring Cases), 600 S.E.2d 188, 19091 (W. Va. 2004).
170. Stern v. Chemtall, Inc., 617 S.E.2d 876, 879-80 (W. Va. 2005). The
broadly defined class included coal preparation plant workers in West Virginia,
Virginia, Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Tennessee. Id. at 880.
171. 575 S.E.2d 342, 344 (W. Va. 2002). The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals declined to create a new cause of action for “property monitoring,”
stating that “[n]either West Virginia common law nor West Virginia statutory law
presently supports or recognizes a claim for property monitoring.” Id. at 346.
172. See also Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 696 n.15 (“[E]ven if we
were to create a medical monitoring cause of action, in light of both the essentially
limitless number of such exposures and the limited resource pool from which
such exposures can be compensated, a ‘cutoff’ line would still inevitably need to
be drawn.”); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 845 (noting that the Bower
criteria “will not prevent most well-prepared cases from reaching triers of fact”).
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173

action.
For example, in a medical monitoring action where the
plaintiff has been exposed to a toxic substance but has not suffered
present physical injury, such a plaintiff may be awarded a sum of
money commensurate with the costs of future medical
174
surveillance. If the same plaintiff were to later develop an injury
as a result of the earlier exposure, that plaintiff may be precluded
175
from bringing the same claim for additional damages.
Thus, a
court’s failure to recognize a cause of action for medical
monitoring in the absence of a present physical injury could be
176
considered a “safeguard that benefits victims.”
VII. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT SHOULD LEAVE THE ISSUE OF
MEDICAL MONITORING TO THE LEGISLATURE
Another argument against the position that courts should
allow recovery for medical monitoring absent present physical
injury is that the authorization for such a remedy should come
from the various state legislatures rather than as a judicially created
177
remedy.
This section is not intended to suggest that the
Minnesota Supreme Court is never capable of creating common
178
law causes of action or remedies.
In fact, there are a number of
instances where courts should further the law’s development by
adopting new common law claims and remedies independent of
legislative action where public policy so demands. Nonetheless,
this section argues that because of the extraordinary considerations
involved with the medical monitoring issue in particular, the
legislature is better equipped than courts to deal appropriately with
the issue.

173. See Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 858 (Ky. 2002) (citing City
of Louisville v. Louisville Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n, 813 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Ky. 1991)).
174. See id.
175. See id.; see also Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1079 (“[A] medical
monitoring award could preclude plaintiffs from seeking additional damages if
and when they actually develop a disease or injury.”).
176. Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 858.
177. See Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1071.
178. See Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the
legislature.”).
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A. The Large Number of Questions Associated with the Award of
Monitoring Expenses Favors Legislative Consideration
There are a number of convincing reasons why courts should
avoid assuming the role of lawmakers with regard to medical
179
monitoring. First, legislatures are in a better position than courts
to acquire all of the relevant information in making such a
180
complex and sweeping change to traditional tort law.
Legislatures have more access to information and resources than
the courts, and are in a better position than the courts to weigh the
previously discussed social costs and benefits of monitoring
181
programs.
Moreover, because tort law has traditionally
developed “in a slow, incremental fashion,” the recognition of such
182
a novel theory “warrants legislative consideration.”
Second, a legislature’s prospective treatment of medical
monitoring awards would provide fair notice to potential
183
tortfeasors.
That is, because a court’s ruling occurs on a
retroactive basis, the public is broad-sided when its potential legal
obligations are changed for actions committed sometimes years
184
before the ruling.
Thus, changing existing law in a prospective
manner through the legislative process would provide “fair notice”
to those potentially affected, and allow current offenders to change
185
their behavior.
In addition, the complexity involved in determining whether
monitoring payments are to be paid pursuant to a court-created
186
fund or by lump-sum payment favor legislative control.
This
justification is especially important given the pervasive abuse of

179. See Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1071-81.
180. Id. at 1071.
181. Id. at 1072-73.
182. Id. at 1073-74 (noting that judicial changes to longstanding common law
rules “such as the development of strict products liability in tort, the removal of
the privity barrier, . . . the evolution from contributory negligence to comparative
fault, . . . the modification of traditional immunities, permitting recovery for a
child who had been injured in the womb, and the modification of the assumption
of risk defense” have occurred gradually over a number of years).
183. Id. at 1075.
184. Id.
185. Id.; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (stating
on the subject of punitive damages that “[e]lementary notions of fairness
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair
notice . . . of the conduct that will subject him to [liability]”).
186. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1077.
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187

lump-sum monitoring awards.
Finally, monitoring claims involving collateral compensation
188
demand careful consideration from the legislature.
Under the
“collateral source rule,” benefits received by a plaintiff from a
variety of sources including “health or medical insurance, disability
insurance, workers’ compensation benefits, and . . . government
benefits, are . . . deemed ‘collateral’ to the tortfeasor” and are thus
not deducted when calculating plaintiff’s award under a
189
monitoring claim.
As a result, third-party payment plans may
overlap with an award of monitoring expenses further complicating
190
the process.
B. Several Courts Favor Legislative Consideration of Medical Monitoring
A number of courts have similarly expressed concern over a
judicially created remedy for medical monitoring, instead favoring
a legislative approach. For example, in Badillo v. American Brands,
Inc., the Supreme Court of Nevada, addressing the issue of medical
monitoring, stated: “Altering common law rights, creating new
causes of action, and providing new remedies for wrongs is
191
generally a legislative, not a judicial, function.”
Similarly, in
Carroll, the court noted: “If a North Carolina court were faced with
the question of whether to create a tort . . . for medical monitoring
costs . . . it would decline to create such a tort [and] [i]nstead it
192
would look to the legislature for guidance.”
The U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington stated in Duncan that
“[t]he Washington Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the
state legislature for the creation of new causes of action,” and
“[t]he legislature has a ‘greater ability to fully explore the spectrum
of competing societal interests,’ while the judiciary ‘is the least
capable of receiving public input and resolving broad public policy
193
questions based on societal consensus.’”
Most recently, the Michigan Supreme Court in Henry v. Dow
187. Id. at 1077-78.
188. Id. at 1078.
189. Id.; see also John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in
Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478, 1478 (1966).
190. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1078.
191. 16 P.3d 435, 440 (Nev. 2001).
192. Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969, at *51
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990).
193. Duncan v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 605-06 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(internal citation omitted).
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Chemical Co. declined to recognize a medical monitoring claim
194
The court decided instead to
absent present physical injury.
defer to the state legislature, who in the court’s opinion was “better
suited to undertake the complex task of balancing the competing
195
societal interests at stake.”
The court in Henry proffered additional reasons for its
preference that the legislature address medical monitoring. First,
the court noted that the principle of separation of powers bars
196
policy-making by the court. In addition, the court was concerned
with how to determine whether the plaintiffs would be eligible to
197
participate in a particular monitoring program. The court stated
that “[s]uch a determination involves the consideration of a
number of practical questions and the balancing of a host of
competing interests—a task more appropriate for the legislative
198
branch than the judiciary.”
The court was also concerned with
199
The court
the subsequent administration of such programs.
194. 701 N.W.2d 684, 685-86 (Mich. 2005) (involving residents allegedly
exposed to dioxin discharged by a nearby chemical plant).
195. Id. at 686. The court stated that “[i]n reality, plaintiffs propose a
transformation in tort law that will require the courts of this state—in this case and
the thousands that would inevitably follow—to make decisions that are more
characteristic of those made in the legislative, executive, and administrative
processes.” Id. at 692.
196. Id. at 697.
197. Id. at 698. Some of the questions facing courts when determining an
individual’s eligibility for a medical monitoring program include:
How old does the applicant have to be? How long must an applicant
have lived in the affected area? Where, exactly, is the “affected area”?
Must the applicant have measurable levels of dioxin in the bloodstream
to qualify? If so, what is the threshold level of dioxin an applicant must
have for eligibility?
Id. at 698 n.22.
198. Id. at 698.
199. Id. at 698-99. Some of the questions courts need to consider in
administering a medical monitoring program include:
How would claims be filed? How would claims be processed? Who
would do the processing-court staff or a private contract firm? Would a
claimant be free to receive testing from any medical facility he chooses,
or would a claimant’s choice of testing facility be limited? To keep down
costs of the program, could defendant be permitted to establish a
“preferred provider network” of medical professionals such that
claimants could only be tested within the network? In the absence of
such a network, would claimants be limited to the usual and necessary
costs for such services, or is the sky the limit? How would the system
reconcile two different physicians’ opinions of what is “reasonable” in
terms of medical testing? Would there be a grievance procedure? Would
defendant be billed directly, or would it periodically pay into a fund?
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noted that the operation of a monitoring program would “impose
huge clerical burdens on a court system lacking the resources to
effectively administer such a regime” and that the courts do not
“possess the technical expertise necessary to effectively administer a
program heavily dependent on scientific disciplines such as
200
medicine, chemistry, and environmental science.”
As a result of
these concerns, the court concluded that “[t]he court system . . . is
simply not institutionally equipped to establish, promulgate
201
operative rules for, or administer such a program.”
C. Louisiana Serves as a Successful Model for Legislative Consideration
of Medical Monitoring
Louisiana’s consideration of medical monitoring demonstrates
that state legislatures are capable of making the complex policy
decisions associated with the issue. In Bourgeois v. A.P. Green
Industries, Inc., past and current shipyard employees, who alleged
that they were exposed to asbestos, brought a class action suit
against manufacturers, sellers, and suppliers of asbestos used at the
202
The plaintiffs sought medical monitoring to detect
shipyards.
potential diseases, and the establishment of a judicially
203
administered fund for the medical monitoring. The issue before
the court was “whether asymptomatic plaintiffs, who have had
significant occupational exposure to asbestos and must now bear
the expense of periodic medical examinations to monitor the
effects of that exposure, have suffered ‘damage’ under Louisiana
204
Civil Code article 2315.”
The applicable statute provided that
“[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges
205
him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that
Louisiana law had not previously allowed the recovery of medical
expenses “[a]bsent a corresponding physical injury,” the court
decided to recognize medical monitoring absent present physical
206
injury.
In doing so, the court stated that medical monitoring

Id. at 699 n.23.
200. Id. at 699.
201. Id.
202. 716 So. 2d 355, 356 (La. 1998).
203. Id. at 356-57.
204. Id. at 357.
205. Id. at 357 n.6 (internal citation omitted).
206. Id. at 358-59.
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costs were a “compensable item of damage under Civil Code article
207
2315” as long as specific criteria were met.
In response to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in
Bourgeois, the Louisiana legislature amended article 2315 in 1999 to
208
supersede the court’s decision. Article 2315, which provides for a
person’s liability for acts causing damages, now excludes the
following types of damages: “costs for future medical treatment,
services, surveillance, or procedures of any kind unless such
treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures are directly related
209
to a manifest physical or mental injury or disease.”
Thus, article
2315 now excludes recovery for medical monitoring unless present
210
physical injury can be shown. More importantly, however, article
2315 displays the ability of state legislatures to evaluate and make
rational decisions regarding significant and competing policy
211
concerns that effect litigation.
207. Id. at 360. The criteria included:
(1) significant exposure to a proven hazardous substance; (2) as a
proximate result of this exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (3) plaintiff’s risk of
contracting a serious latent disease is greater than (a) the risk of
contracting the same disease had he or she not been exposed and (b) the
chances of members of the public at large of developing the disease; (4)
a monitoring procedure exists that makes the early detection of the
disease possible; (5) the monitoring procedure has been prescribed by a
qualified physician and is reasonably necessary according to
contemporary scientific principles; (6) the prescribed monitoring regime
is different from that normally recommended in the absence of
exposure; and (7) there is some demonstrated clinical value in the early
detection and diagnosis of the disease.
Id. at 360-61.
208. Act of July 9, 1999, H.B. 1784, 1999 L.A. Legis 989 (1999) (revising article
2315); see also James E. Lapeze, Implications of Amending Civil Code Article 2315 on
Toxic Torts in Louisiana, 60 LA. L. REV. 833, 833 (2000) (“The revision seems clearly
aimed at eliminating medical monitoring as a viable element of damages
recoverable in Louisiana.”).
209. Lapeze, supra note 208, at 841. The Louisiana Court of Appeals noted
that despite the Legislature’s intent that the amendment have retroactive effect,
the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the amendment cannot be applied
retroactively so as to violate a person’s due process rights by divesting such person
of vested rights. Motorola, Inc. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 878 So. 2d 824, 833-34
(La. Ct. App. 2004).
210. See Lapeze, supra note 208, at 842 (citing article 2315 and noting that the
amended language “seems to be referring to a pure medical monitoring recovery,
one that does not include any actual injury . . . barring medical monitoring as a
separate theory of recovery in the absence of manifest physical or mental injury”).
211. See also Maskin et al., supra 158, at 548 (stating that article 2315 is an
example “of a swift, clear legislative response to curb the scope of the medical
monitoring remedy, in an attempt to compensate only those with truly meritorious
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Recognition of medical monitoring absent present physical
injury represents a sweeping change to tort law. Given the
increasingly litigious nature of society, coupled with public hysteria
concerning exposure to toxic contaminants, it is fair to say that
future courts will be confronted with the medical monitoring issue
on a number of occasions.
When faced with the issue, the Minnesota Supreme Court
should require that plaintiffs show an actual, present physical injury
prior to recovery. This is the approach supported by the United
212
States Supreme Court in Metro-North and by a growing number of
213
It is also the best approach given the significant policy
states.
concerns present in permitting recovery absent present physical
injury. Finally, this standard still allows plaintiffs who have
developed a present and manifest illness or disease as a result of
exposure to toxins the ability to seek recovery for the costs of
monitoring.
That having been said, because of the complex policy
considerations and the balancing of societal interests inherently
present in evaluating the medical monitoring issue, the ideal
scenario is for Minnesota courts to delay a judicially fashioned
remedy for medical monitoring pending consideration of the issue
by the Minnesota legislature.
IX. STATE SURVEY APPENDIX OF CASE LAW
The following appendix contains a brief summary of the case
law noted in the tables found in Part IV.A-C.
Alabama
In Hinton, the plaintiff brought a claim against a chemical
company alleging that he was exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) when the company released chemicals into the
214
environment. The plaintiff sought to recover the costs of medical
215
216
monitoring.
In answering the question certified by the U.S.
claims”).
212. See supra Part II.B.
213. See supra Part IV.
214. Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 828 (Ala. 2001).
215. Id.
216. The U.S. District Court certified the following question: “Does a
complaint which does not allege any past or present personal injury to the plaintiff
state a cause of action for medical monitoring and study when the plaintiff alleges
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District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the Supreme
Court of Alabama stated that Alabama law does not recognize a
cause of action for medical monitoring absent a manifest physical
217
injury or illness.
Arizona
In Burns, residents of a trailer park located adjacent to an
asbestos-producing mill brought suit, seeking damages for personal
218
The plaintiffs also sought
injuries and property damage.
damages for medical surveillance to monitor any potential
219
development of asbestos-related diseases.
The Arizona Court of
Appeals held that “despite the absence of physical manifestation of
any asbestos-related diseases . . . plaintiffs should be entitled to . . .
220
regular medical testing and evaluation.”
Arkansas
In Baker, the Supreme Court of Arkansas noted that although
“[t]he complaint originally contained a cause of action for medical
monitoring . . . the plaintiffs agreed to treat medical monitoring as
221
a type of damages instead of a separate cause of action.”
The
court did not elaborate, however, on whether Arkansas law requires
a plaintiff to show present physical injury to seek out such a
remedy.
California
In Potter, the plaintiff landowners brought a claim against a tire
222
manufacturer that disposed of its toxic waste at a nearby landfill.
The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the defendant’s practices,
223
The
they experienced prolonged exposure to carcinogens.
California Supreme Court concluded that the costs of medical
monitoring were a compensable item of damages when “liability is

that he has been exposed to hazardous contamination and pollution by the
conduct of the defendant?” Id.
217. Id. at 832; see also S. Bakeries, Inc. v. Knipp, 852 So. 2d 712, 717-19 (Ala.
2002) (reaffirming in an asbestos exposure case that Alabama does not recognize
a cause of action for medical monitoring absent a present physical injury).
218. Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 29-30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
219. Id. at 30.
220. Id. at 33. The court also held that the money for medical monitoring
should be allocated through a fund administered by the court, as opposed to a
lump sum payment. Id. at 34.
221. Baker v. Wyeth-Ayerst Lab. Div., 992 S.W.2d 797, 799 n.2 (Ark. 1999)
(involving plaintiffs who had used a weight loss drug that was subsequently
removed from the market due to its dangerousness).
222. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 801 (Cal. 1993).
223. Id.
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established under traditional tort theories of recovery” and where
the need for medical monitoring is a “reasonably certain
consequence of a plaintiff’s toxic exposure and that the
224
recommended monitoring is reasonable.”
The court also noted,
however, that “[r]ecognition that a defendant’s conduct has
created the need for future medical monitoring does not create a
225
new tort.”
Colorado
In Cook, the plaintiffs were landowners who sued the operators
of a nearby nuclear weapons plant for injuries and damages caused
by hazardous substances either released or threatened to be
226
released.
The plaintiffs brought a number of claims including
227
The
one for medical monitoring under Colorado common law.
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado predicted that the
Colorado Supreme Court would recognize a claim for medical
228
monitoring.
Connecticut
In Martin, the plaintiff landowners brought an action against
the owner of a neighboring gas station after methyl tertiary-butyl
229
ether (MTBE) was found in the groundwater near the gas station.
The plaintiffs sought damages in the form of medical
230
monitoring.
In denying the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment to bar the plaintiffs from pursuing medical monitoring as
a remedy, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut
stated that the “Connecticut Supreme Court has cited favorably a
Third Circuit case that allowed medical monitoring in the absence
231
of present injury.”

224. Id. at 824.
225. Id. at 823; see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 63 P.3d 913
(Cal. 2003) (reaffirming that medical monitoring is not a separate cause of action
under California law).
226. Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1468, 1471 (D. Colo. 1991).
227. Id. at 1476.
228. Id. at 1477. The court also predicted that the Colorado Supreme Court
would not, on the other hand, likely recognize a claim for “generalized scientific
studies” to be paid by defendant. Id. at 1478.
229. Martin v. Shell Oil Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316 (D. Conn. 2002).
230. Id. at 322.
231. Id. at 323; see also Doe v. City of Stamford, 699 A.2d 52 (Conn. 1997)
(citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990) favorably yet
proceeding instead to analyze the facts under a state workers’ compensation law).
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Delaware
In Mergenthaler, the plaintiffs, former asbestos workers and
their spouses, brought claims against employers and others based
on occupational exposure to asbestos during the course of their
232
employment.
Specifically, the workers’ wives brought an action
seeking recovery of medical surveillance expenses as a result of
potentially coming into contact with asbestos while washing their
233
husbands’ work clothes.
The Supreme Court of Delaware
determined that the workers’ wives failed to state a claim because
they made no showing of present physical injury or actual exposure
234
to the asbestos.
235
District of Columbia
Florida
In Petito, the plaintiffs brought a class action against
pharmaceutical manufacturers and sellers seeking an injunction
requiring the defendants to fund a court supervised medical
monitoring program for conditions caused by the plaintiff’s use of
236
weight-loss drugs. At the time of the claim, the plaintiffs did not
237
have physical injuries as a result of using the drugs. Nonetheless,
the Florida District Court of Appeal held that Florida would
recognize an action for medical monitoring absent physical injury
if the plaintiffs could show the monitoring was reasonably
238
necessary.
Guam
In Abuan, the plaintiffs were allegedly exposed to PCBs,
dioxins, and furans when the transformer on a junction box
239
ruptured.
Plaintiffs brought a class action against the PCB
manufacturer and the manufacturer of the electrical transformer,
232. Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 649 (Del. 1984).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 651.
235. See supra Part II.A.
236. Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 104-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
237. Id. at 104. In response, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, contending that the state of Florida does not recognize claims for the
costs of medical monitoring absent injury. Id. at 105.
238. Id. at 105. The court later stated: “We find nothing in Florida law barring
such a claim and caselaw [sic], equity, common sense, and the decisions of courts
around the country persuade us that under the limited and appropriate
circumstances outlined herein, such a claim is viable and necessary to do justice.”
Id. at 108 (footnote omitted).
239. Abuan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1116 (1994).
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seeking, among other things, to recover the costs of medical
240
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
monitoring.
because the plaintiffs could not show that they suffered a
“significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease,”
the district court properly granted the manufacturers’ motion for
summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for medical monitoring
241
damages.
Illinois
In Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chemical LLC, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois stated that “[n]either the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit nor any Illinois reviewing
court has decided” whether the State of Illinois would recognize a
242
claim for medical monitoring absent present physical injury.
Similarly, in Guillory v. American Tobacco Co., the court stated, “[i]t
should be noted . . . that it is far from clear whether Illinois
recognizes medical monitoring as an independent cause of
243
action.”
However, in Lewis, the Illinois Appellate Court
considered whether, unlike recovery for an increased risk of future
harm in a tort action, “the cost of diagnostic testing to detect a
possible injury . . . is in itself a present injury compensable in a tort
244
action,” even in the absence of any present physical injury.
The
court reasoned that, “a claim seeking damages for the cost of a
medical examination is not speculative and the necessity for such
an examination is capable of proof within a ‘reasonable degree of
245
medical certainty.’”

240. Id.
241. Id. at 344-35. The court adopted the framework of Ayers, stating that in
order to recover the expenses associated with medical monitoring the plaintiffs
must show:
1. Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance
through the negligent actions of the defendant.
2. As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease.
3. That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations
reasonably necessary.
4. Monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early
detection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial.
Id. at 335.
242. No. 96 C 8583, 1999 WL 966484, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999).
243. No. 97 C 8641, 2001 WL 290603, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2001).
244. Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
245. Id. at 874.
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Indiana
In Baker, the plaintiff homeowner brought a claim against the
defendant employer, alleging the defendant allowed the plaintiff to
take scrap insulation home for personal use despite the
defendant’s knowledge that the insulation was contaminated with
246
PCBs.
The complaint alleged a number of claims, and sought
compensation for, among other things, the costs of future medical
247
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
monitoring.
Indiana granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
248
claims for future medical monitoring expenses without prejudice.
The district court allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend
their medical monitoring claim to allege a present physical injury
249
caused by the contaminated insulation.
The district court
subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for medical
monitoring expenses after it found the plaintiff had not suffered
250
any physical injury caused by exposure to PCBs.
On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
findings, holding that the plaintiffs’ waiver of all damages claims,
including the medical monitoring claim, precluded the plaintiff’s
251
right to challenge the district court’s rulings.
Kansas
In Burton, the plaintiff, a smoker who suffered from disease,
252
brought a number of claims against manufacturers of cigarettes.
The defendants brought a motion to dismiss arguing, in part, that
Kansas had not adopted medical monitoring as an independent
253
cause of action. The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas
agreed, holding that the plaintiff’s claim for medical monitoring
was “merely a component of plaintiff’s damages relating to his
254
other claims.” Thus, the court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the plaintiff’s medical monitoring claim, in effect holding
that Kansas allows for the recovery of medical monitoring expenses
in the form of damages when such expenses are related to a

246. Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 70 F.3d 951, 952 (7th Cir. 1995).
247. Id. at 953.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 955.
252. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515, 1517-18 (D. Kan.
1995).
253. Id. at 1518.
254. Id. at 1523.
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255

present physical injury.
Kentucky
In Wood, the plaintiff, who had consumed diet drugs, brought
256
an action against the drug manufacturer.
The plaintiff alleged
increased health risks resulting from the drug, and sought medical
monitoring expenses and the establishment of a monitoring
257
fund. At the time the plaintiff brought suit, the plaintiff had not
258
The
suffered from any injury as a result of using the diet drugs.
Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected the plaintiff’s claim for
medical monitoring damages absent a showing of present physical
259
injury.
Maryland
In Philip Morris Inc., the plaintiffs, current and former tobacco
users, claimed to have been injured by tobacco use and brought an
260
action against tobacco manufacturers.
The plaintiffs sought, in
part, injunctive relief through a court-supervised medical
261
monitoring fund to be funded by the defendants. The Maryland
Court of Appeals granted the defendants’ petition for writ of
mandamus and prohibition seeking decertification of the plaintiffs’
262
classes. In doing so, the court noted that it had not yet addressed
the issue of whether medical monitoring is a valid cause of action
or remedy in Maryland, and while the court recognized it would
need to do so eventually, the issue was not yet ripe for its
263
decision.
Michigan
In Henry, the plaintiff residents brought an action against a
chemical company alleging that the defendant negligently released
264
dioxin from its plant.
The plaintiffs sought the creation of a
255. Id.; see also Cott v. Peppermint Twist Mgmt. Co., 856 P.2d 906, 922 (Kan.
1993) (permitting recovery by plaintiffs for the costs of medical monitoring when
such expenses were associated with a present physical injury).
256. Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Ky. 2002).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 859. Specifically, the court concluded “having weighed the few
potential benefits against the many almost-certain problems of medical
monitoring, we are convinced that this Court has little reason to allow such a
remedy without a showing of present physical injury.” Id.
260. Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 205 (Md. 2000).
261. Id. at 206.
262. See id. at 205.
263. Id. at 251.
264. Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 685-86 (Mich. 2005). Dioxin is
a synthetic chemical that can potentially be hazardous to human health. Id.
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court-supervised program, paid for by the defendant, which would
monitor the class for possible manifestations of dioxin-related
265
disease.
The defendant moved to dismiss the medical
monitoring claim on the ground that the claim was not recognized
266
The circuit court subsequently denied the motion
in Michigan.
and the Michigan Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s
267
application for interlocutory appeal.
The Michigan Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for summary disposition in favor of
268
the defendant on the plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim.
The
court held that the plaintiffs did not present a cognizable
negligence claim under Michigan common law because the
269
plaintiffs failed to allege a present physical injury.
270
Minnesota
Missouri
In Thomas, the plaintiffs brought an action against a defendant
corporation that allegedly caused groundwater contamination to
271
which the plaintiffs were allegedly exposed.
The U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Missouri stated that
“[e]ntitlement to the costs of future medical monitoring requires
plaintiff to prove actual present injury and an increased risk of
272
future harm.” Because the plaintiffs did not present evidence of
actual physical injury, the court granted the defendants motion for
273
summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim.
Montana
In Lamping, a Montana state district court, in an unreported
decision, recognized a cause of action for medical monitoring,
stating that “‘the patient’s independent claim for medical
monitoring accrues when the patient can meet all of the elements

265. Id. at 686.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. The court explained that merely being exposed to toxins with the
increased risk of future harm does not constitute an “injury” for tort law purposes.
Id. at 688-89. Rather, “[i]t is a present injury, not fear of an injury in the future,
that gives rise to a cause of action under negligence theory.” Id. at 689.
270. See supra Part III.
271. Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1400, 1403-04 (W.D. Mo.
1994).
272. Id. at 1410.
273. Id. The court noted, however, that if and when the plaintiffs exhibit
injuries at some time in the future, the plaintiffs should “be able to bring such
claims without suffering preclusive effects.” Id. at 1411.
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of the claim, which notably does not include an actual physical
274
injury element.’”
Nebraska
In Trimble, plaintiffs who resided near a former lead refinery
brought a class action against the owner and former operator of
the plant alleging that their properties had been contaminated by
275
pollutants from the site.
The plaintiffs also brought a state law
276
The United States Court of
claim for medical monitoring.
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ claim for
medical monitoring expenses in the absence of a present physical
277
injury was not cognizable under Nebraska law.
Nevada
In Badillo, smokers and casino employees brought a class
278
action against the defendants.
The plaintiffs sought the
establishment of a court-supervised medical monitoring fund to
279
help diagnose and treat tobacco-related illnesses.
The Supreme
Court of Nevada, after accepting the certified question from the
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, determined that the
common law of Nevada did not recognize a cause of action for
280
medical monitoring.
274. In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Silzone Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL
01-1396, 2004 WL 45504, at *7 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004) (quoting Lamping v. Am.
Home Prods., Inc., No. DV-97-85786 (Mont. 4th Dist. Ct. Feb. 2, 2000)). The
court adopted the elements for a claim set forth by the Florida District Court of
Appeals in Petito. Id.
275. Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2000), abrogated on
procedural grounds Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611
(2005).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 963. The court agreed with the earlier prediction of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska that the state of Nebraska would not
recognize a claim for medical monitoring, which reasoned:
[T]he plaintiffs have cited no authority, and the court has found none,
which would suggest that Nebraska law recognizes either a cause of
action for medical monitoring or a remedy involving the creation of a
medical monitoring fund. There exists no pending or prospective
legislation to authorize a cause of action or a remedy for medical
monitoring, and the court finds it improbable that the Nebraska courts
would judicially fashion such a right or remedy.
Id. (quoting Trimble v. ASARCO Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1041 (D. Neb. 1999)).
278. Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 438 (Nev. 2001).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 440. The court did state that a remedy of medical monitoring could
be available depending on the underlying cause of action. Id. at 441. While the
court noted the fact that there is not agreement among other jurisdictions as to
whether a present physical injury is necessary for a medical monitoring claim, the
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New Jersey
In Ayers, the township residents brought an action against the
municipality when toxic pollutants leached into a water aquifer
281
from a landfill operated by the municipality.
The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that medical monitoring expenses should be
awarded to the residents based upon an enhanced, although
unquantified, risk of future disease because of the plaintiffs’
282
exposure to the pollutants.
New York
In Patton, an employee brought suit against the defendants for
283
improper removal and exposure to asbestos. The plaintiff sought
284
damages including costs of future medical monitoring. The U.S.
District Court for the Western District of New York predicted that
the New York Court of Appeals would recognize a cause of action
285
for medical surveillance absent proof of injury.
court did not address the issue of whether a present physical injury would be
necessary for such a remedy in Nevada. See id.
281. Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 291 (N.J. 1987).
282. Id. at 313. Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not required
to demonstrate a prior injury from exposure before recovering the expenses of
future medical monitoring. The court stated that:
[W]e hold that the cost of medical surveillance is a compensable item of
damages where the proofs demonstrate, through reliable expert
testimony predicated upon the significance and extent of exposure to
chemicals, the toxicity of the chemicals, the seriousness of the diseases
for which individuals are at risk, the relative increase in the chance of
onset of disease in those exposed, and the value of early diagnosis, that
such surveillance to monitor the effect of exposure to toxic chemicals is
reasonable and necessary.
Id. at 312; see also Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993)
(concluding that “medical surveillance damages are not available for plaintiffs who
have not experienced direct and hence discrete exposure to a toxic substance and
who have not suffered an injury or condition resulting from that exposure”). Ayers
is considered by some commentators to be the “seminal decision” allowing
recovery for medical surveillance in the absence of present physical injury.
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 839; see also Klein, supra note 155, at 6
(noting that Friends for All Children did not break ground in allowing medical
surveillance claims).
283. Patton v. Gen. Signal Corp., 984 F. Supp. 666, 667-68 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
284. Id. at 668.
285. Id. at 673; see also Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (“Medical monitoring could be a recoverable consequential
damage provided that plaintiffs can establish with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that such expenditures are ‘reasonably anticipated’ to be incurred by
reason of their exposure.”). But see Abusio v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. Inc., 656
N.Y.S.2d 371, 371-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that for a plaintiff to maintain
a cause of action for future medical monitoring costs “plaintiff must establish both
that he or she was in fact exposed to the disease-causing agent and that there is a
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North Carolina
In Carroll, the plaintiffs alleged exposure to chemicals
286
including TCE emanating from the defendant’s plant.
The
plaintiffs sought costs for medical surveillance “to detect the onset
287
of any symptoms of diseases caused by the chemicals.” The court
held that it “should not recognize a common law claim for the costs
of medical monitoring in the absence of clear direction from the
288
North Carolina courts or legislature.”
The court further noted
that North Carolina courts “if faced with the question of whether to
create a tort . . . for medical monitoring costs . . . would decline to
289
create such a tort.”
Ohio
In Day, employee workers and frequenters of a nuclear
weapons components manufacturing plant brought a class action
290
against the manufacturer for exposure to radiation.
The
291
plaintiffs sought a court supervised medical surveillance program.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that
the plaintiffs could recover for medical monitoring if they could
“show by expert medical testimony that they have increased risk of
disease which would warrant a reasonable physician to order
292
monitoring.”
Pennsylvania
In Redland Soccer Club, Inc., the plaintiffs brought an action
against the defendants alleging that the defendants’ disposal of

‘rational basis’ for his or her fear of contracting the disease”; where “rational basis”
means “the clinically demonstrable presence” of disease in plaintiff’s body).
286. Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969, at *1
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990).
287. Id. at *2.
288. Id. at *51.
289. Id. The court later stated that even if North Carolina courts would in fact
recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring, the plaintiffs’ claims would
fail here because of the lack of evidence that the plaintiffs would contract any
disease in the future. Id. at *53; see also Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 285
(4th Cir. 2000) (noting a jury award of $9.5 million for medical monitoring
damages, although not stating the test used by the court).
290. Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 874 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
291. Id. at 875.
292. Id. at 881. The court further provided that “[t]he monitoring must be
directed toward the disease for which the tort victim is at risk, and will only
include procedures which are medically prudent in light of that risk as opposed to
measures aimed at general health.” Id.; see also McCafferty v. Centerior Serv. Co.,
983 F. Supp. 715, 731 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (“Plaintiffs’ claim for medical monitoring
is dependent upon a finding of liability for a substantive cause of action.”).
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293

hazardous materials caused the plaintiffs harm.
The plaintiffs
sought the establishment of a medical monitoring trust fund to pay
294
for physical examinations.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
set forth the requirements for bringing a medical monitoring
claim, which did not require a present physical injury for
295
recovery.
Puerto Rico
In Barreras Ruiz, persons who had purchased and smoked
cigarettes, nicotine dependent cigarette smokers, and their
relatives brought a motion for class certification in an action
296
Plaintiffs sought to recover
against tobacco manufacturers.
damages resulting from their addiction, as well as the costs of
297
medical monitoring.
In denying plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification, the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
noted: “[W]e will not consider the substantive question of whether
298
Puerto Rico law authorizes medical monitoring.”
South Carolina
In Rosmer, the plaintiff allegedly contracted hepatitis by using a
299
prescription antibiotic designed by the defendant.
In denying
the plaintiff’s motion to certify a medical monitoring class, the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina stated that “South
Carolina has not recognized a cause of action for medical
300
monitoring.”
Tennessee
In Craft, the plaintiffs, a group of women who unknowingly
ingested radioactive isotopes while pregnant, brought suit on
301
behalf of themselves and their children.
The U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee certified the class of exposed
women and children under Rule 23(b)(2) for their medical
293. Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 139 (Pa.
1997).
294. Id. at 139-40.
295. See id. at 145-46.
296. Barreras Ruiz v. Am. Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194, 195 (D.P.R. 1998).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 197. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class “based
on the proposed class action’s lack of superiority over individual actions” and “the
lack of a predominance of common issues among the members of the proposed
class.” Id. at 199.
299. Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., No. CIV.A. 9:99-2280-18RB, 2001 WL 34010613, at
*1 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2001).
300. Id. at *5.
301. Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174 F.R.D. 396, 400 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
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302

monitoring claim.
The court, however, did not discuss the
elements of a medical monitoring claim in the state of
303
Tennessee.
Texas
In Norwood, plaintiffs allegedly exposed to radars brought suit
against defendant designers, manufacturers, and marketers of
304
radar equipment.
Plaintiffs sought to certify two classes,
including a medical monitoring class consisting of individuals
exposed to radiation but not suffering from illness or injury as a
305
result of such exposure. Defendants brought a motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claims, arguing that Texas did not
306
recognize medical monitoring as a cause of action.
The U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas granted defendants’
motion to dismiss, holding that while “Texas courts have not had
occasion to address medical monitoring as a cause of action,” the
Texas Supreme Court would likely reject medical monitoring
307
claims absent a present physical injury.
Utah
In Hansen, renovation workers brought an action against the
owner of an office building seeking to recover the costs of medical
monitoring arising from the plaintiffs’ exposure to asbestos while
308
performing renovation work.
The Supreme Court of Utah set
forth the test to use in determining whether to award medical
monitoring expenses, noting specifically that the trial court applied
the “wrong legal standard” when it granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment because “no bodily injury [had] been

302. Id. at 406-07.
303. See id.; see also Daniels v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 583 S.W.2d 768 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1978) (declining to address the issue of medical surveillance expenses
where an employee who installed asbestos-related insulation contracted asbestosis
and brought an action against insulation manufacturers).
304. Norwood v. Raytheon Co., No. EP-04-CA-127-PRM, 2006 WL 267335, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2006).
305. Id.
Specifically, the medical monitoring plaintiffs sought the
establishment of a court administered medical monitoring fund to pay for medical
surveillance “deemed reasonably and medically necessary” to protect the plaintiffs
“from an increased risk of harm and disease.” Id. at *2.
306. Id.
307. Id. at *5, 7. The court stated that the “Texas Supreme Court appears
disposed to rely on the same policy considerations in rejecting medical monitoring
claims that it relied on in rejecting mental anguish claims in the absense of a
present physical injury.” Id. at *5.
308. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply, 858 P.2d 970, 972-73 (Utah 1993).
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309

manifested [by the] plaintiff.”
Virginia
In Ball, the plaintiffs, mostly former employees who had been
exposed to toxic chemicals, brought an action against their
employer seeking to recover damages for the cost of medical
310
surveillance necessitated by their exposure.
The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to show
that they were suffering from present physical injury, and thus they
could not recover the expenses of medical monitoring under
311
Virginia law.
Virgin Islands
In Purjet, the plaintiff brought suit alleging repeated exposure
to asbestos at defendant’s refinery over the course of his
312
employment as an insulation supervisor.
Plaintiff also brought
suit on behalf of his daughter, who was also allegedly exposed to
313
asbestos that plaintiff brought home on his clothing. At the time
plaintiffs brought suit, neither was presently suffering from any
314
asbestos-related disease.
Defendant brought a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a
315
The court granted defendant’s motion
legally cognizable claim.
for summary judgment, stating that actual injury is a prerequisite to
316
a claim for medical monitoring in the Virgin Islands.
Washington
In Duncan, the plaintiff, a nonsmoking flight attendant,
brought a class action against the employer defendant claiming
damages for personal injuries suffered from exposure to second317
hand smoke on flights. The plaintiff asserted a claim for medical
309. Id. at 979, 981.
310. Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 37 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1033 (1992).
311. Id. at 39. The court, analyzing the case under Virginia and West Virginia
law, similarly held that plaintiffs could not recover medical surveillance costs
under the law of West Virginia absent present physical injury. Id. But see Bower v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 430 (W. Va. 1999) (rejecting “the
contention that a claim for future medical expenses must rest upon the existence
of present physical harm”).
312. Purjet v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., Civ. No. 1985/284, 1986 WL 1200,
at *1 (V.I. Jan. 8, 1996).
313. Id. Plaintiffs asserted four separate claims, including one for medical
monitoring. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at *4.
317. Duncan v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 603 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
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318

monitoring.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington held that the Washington Supreme Court would not
319
recognize a stand-alone cause of action for medical monitoring.
The court did, however, note that the “plaintiffs with a present
[physical] injury may seek medical monitoring as a remedy to a
320
negligence cause of action under existing Washington law.”
321
West Virginia

318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
Id. at 606.
Id.
See supra Part II.C.
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